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Abstract 
∎ Although the roots of the European Union lie in economic integration, 
the EU’s economic policy competences and possibilities are narrowly 
limited in European primary law. Nevertheless, the influence of the EU, 
and in particular the European Commission, on economic policies of the 
member states is clearly visible and tangible. 
∎ The focus of European economic policy is on the coordination of member 
state policies by the European Commission. It uses strategic planning in-
struments such as 10-year strategies, guidelines, and reform recommen-
dations, which it bundles within the European Semester. 
∎ European economic policy-makers are actually faced with the task of 
limiting the acute socio-economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic 
on the one hand, and finding answers to the structural challenges posed 
by globalisation, digitisation, and climate change on the other. A com-
mon European economic policy is becoming increasingly necessary, and 
expectations are growing. 
∎ The European Commission is trying to combine these two tasks – the 
stimulation of the European economy and the sustainable transformation 
of national economies – with the new European recovery fund “Next 
Generation EU”. The European Green Deal will become the guiding prin-
ciple for both economic policy coordination and economic policy at the 
national level. 
∎ This reorientation of European economic policy towards sustainable and 
decarbonised growth will promote the Europeanisation and, in the long 
term, the unitarisation of national economic policies. 
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Issues and Conclusions 
A European Economic Policy in the 
Making: Success with Modest Means 
One of the roots of the European Union (EU) and a 
major driving force behind the process of European 
integration was, and still is, the integration of national 
economies into a common market with a common 
currency. European unification has always been an 
economic project. This makes it all the more surpris-
ing that the EU is not actually allowed to pursue an 
independent economic policy. The European treaties 
do not provide for this. Instead, the member states 
can only coordinate their respective economic pol-
icies in the common interest. Nevertheless, even the 
EU can fall back on an economic constitution and 
order, and it undoubtedly has its own instruments 
for implementing its economic goals. 
In view of this starting position, two sets of ques-
tions need to be answered: 
1. What are the guiding principles and objectives 
of European economic policy? What are the EU’s 
current competences and possibilities, and how 
does the Union, and in particular the European 
Commission, use its economic policy instruments? 
2 What will European economic policy look like 
in the new decade? What new economic goals are 
moving into the EU’s focus, and how could this 
policy evolve in the long term? 
An analysis of the policy field, tasks, and options of 
European economic policy should start with a descrip-
tion of the competences transferred to the EU by the 
European treaties and the existing policy instruments. 
It is only against this background that it becomes 
apparent how far actual European economic policy 
has distanced itself over the past decade from the 
legal foundation of the policy, which is still formally 
dominated by the EU member states.  
The EU has limited economic policy options, but it 
has used its instruments effectively and successfully 
expanded its room for manoeuvre over the last decade. 
This is particularly true of the European Commission. 
Although still formally dominated by the EU member 
states, it has made skilful use of its room for manoeu-
vre to initiate a steady process of Europeanisation and 
supranationalisation of economic policy. This is an 
approach that will continue with the European Green 
Deal and as part of the joint response to the socio-eco-
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nomic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. If this 
trend continues in the long term, further unitarisa-
tion of European economic policy can be expected. 
However, whether it will be possible to switch to a 
sustainable and climate-protecting form of economic 
activity throughout the EU under the conditions of 
digitisation, as envisaged, depends on whether the 
structural and systemic limitations and obstacles to 
an active, coherent, and efficient European economic 
policy can be removed. To this end, the EU should 
be equipped with additional economic policy instru-
ments, such as an extended competence for fiscal 
policy issues, so that the Community can provide 
effective economic policy incentives through the price 
mechanism. However, this can only be achieved by 
amending the European treaties, that is, gaining the 
consensus of all member states – which is currently 
not in sight. Transferring additional powers and 
adapting the European treaties is therefore a rather 
long-term objective. 
The central instrument of European economic 
policy is the European Semester: a framework for 
policy-making and steering with fixed deadlines for 
evaluation, recommendations, and implementation; 
it brings together and takes into account all economic, 
employment, social, and, in the future, sustainability 
policy goals and strategies of the EU. The reorienta-
tion of the European Semester towards global chal-
lenges should not, however, lead to an overloading of 
this central steering instrument. The economic policy 
objectives should remain at the centre, that is, moni-
toring macroeconomic and fiscal policy in the mem-
ber states and implementing economic policy reforms 
to enhance competitiveness and create jobs. Under 
the conditions laid down in the EU treaties, the Euro-
pean Semester is the only instrument that enables 
effective economic policy coordination of the member 
states: by focussing on common objectives and inter-
ests, through financial incentives from European 
funds and – under certain conditions – through 
sanctions in the event of non-compliance with the 
jointly agreed economic policy. Overloading the Euro-
pean Semester with additional objectives and topics 
should therefore be avoided, as this would threaten 
to undermine the political objectives and make them 
less clear. This could possibly take away the relevance 
and urgency of the Commission’s recommendations 
for economic policy reform. 
The European single market must remain at the 
heart of European economic policy. The European 
social market economy requires open markets and 
free competition. Considerations of politicisation, 
particularly of European competition and state aid 
control, or protectionist restrictions on access are 
therefore not appropriate. The reactions of member 
states at the beginning of the pandemic have shown 
how quickly and far-reaching protectionist measures 
can hinder and slow down the exchange of goods, 
services, and people in the European internal market. 
The very essence of European integration would 
be put at stake. The economic power of the internal 
market and the EU’s regulatory strength will only 
be effective and convincing to global competitors if 
European economic policy respects the foundations 
and framework of its own economic constitution. 
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Economics and politics are closely interwoven; the 
decisions made in political institutions influence 
economic decisions; conversely, the economic situa-
tion and its development affect political preferences 
and priorities.1 The task of economic policy in a 
heterogeneous environment with differentiated 
interests is to find an appropriate balance between 
the individual interests of economic actors, the over-
all welfare, and other political and social objectives. 
In the EU, general economic policy ranges from em-
ployment and social policy to consumer protection, 
infrastructure, tourism, and industrial policy.2 
Consequently, the fields of action of economic 
policy are both the development of structures of the 
economic order and questions of steering and regu-
lating economic processes and decisions. For this 
reason, a distinction is usually made between the 
more structural, long-term, and normatively-oriented 
policy for the creation and shaping of an economic 
order and economic constitution – which essentially 
maps and concretises the decision of a community 
on its economic system – and the more short- to 
medium-term economic process policy, which is primarily 
determined by the day-to-day political decisions of 
the government.3 An economic constitution creates 
the normative foundations of the respective economic 
system of a state and provides the economic constitu-
 
1 Bruno S. Frey, “Eine Theorie demokratischer Wirtschafts-
politik”, Kyklos 31, no. 2 (1978): 208–34; idem, Theorie demo-
kratischer Wirtschaftspolitik (Munich, 1981). Max Weber already 
wrote: “Every rational ‘policy’ uses economic orientation 
in its means and every policy can serve economic goals.” Max 
Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden 
Soziologie, ed. Johannes Winckelmann. Study edition (Tübin-
gen, 1980), 31f. (§1). 
2 These segments are subsumed under the umbrella term 
of “economic policy”. However, they cannot be discussed and 
analysed here in a systematic and differentiated manner. 
3 This distinction between “form and process” in economic 
policy goes back in particular to Walter Eucken. 
tional foundations, which define the framework of 
the respective economic system and the rights and 
obligations of public and private economic actors. In 
essence, the economic constitution is the economic 
system decision of a community and its constitutional 
concretisation. 
Under the special conditions of the EU’s multi-level 
political system, the scope for action for both ele-
ments of economic policy is limited, even though the 
need for a coordinated and effective common Euro-
pean economic policy has become clear to all actors, 
at the latest with the creation of the single European 
market in the early 1990s and the single currency. 
The respective understanding of form, content, task, 
and objective of European economic policy still dif-
fers among the member states. Despite all the pleas 
for a deepened “European economic union for con-
vergence, prosperity and social cohesion”,4 the Euro-
pean Commission concluded as late as 2017 that 
European economic policy will lag behind national 
economic policies, particularly in the euro zone.5 
The European economic constitution: The 
leitmotif of the social market economy 
At a very early stage, Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker con-
sidered the application of the term “economic consti-
tution” to the process of European integration to 
be justified since the Treaty of Rome in 1957.6 Since 
 
4 European Commission, Completing European Economic and 
Monetary Union (Five Presidents’ report). Presented by: Jean-
Claude Juncker in close cooperation with Donald Tusk, 
Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi and Martin Schulz (Brus-
sels, 22 June 2015), 7–11. 
5 Idem, Reflection Paper on Deepening Economic and Monetary 
Union, COM(2017) 291 (Brussels, 31 May 2017). 
6 Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, “Auf dem Wege zu einer 
Ordnungspolitik für Europa”, in idem, ed., Eine Ordnungs-
The Foundations of European 
Economic Policy 
The Foundations of European Economic Policy 
SWP Berlin 
A European Economic Policy in the Making 
October 2020 
8 
then, the European economic constitution has been 
based on free competition between economic actors 
in a common market for the exchange and trade of 
goods, services, capital, and persons. The creation and 
safeguarding of open markets in which undistorted 
competition prevails were – and are – undoubtedly 
constituent elements of a market economy. However, 
this model was initially lacking in the European trea-
ties and therefore repeatedly questioned with refer-
ence to interventions in market mechanisms in agri-
culture and coal and steel. The respective ownership 
systems in the member states initially left the Euro-
pean treaties untouched and open. It was only with 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 that the member states 
and the Community committed themselves to the 
principle of “an open market economy with free com-
petition”,7 a commitment that was finally supple-
mented and reworded by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. 
Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union now refers 
to a “highly competitive social market economy” 
that should also aim at full employment and social 
progress.8 The Treaty of Lisbon also incorporated 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union into European primary law. Its articles – 
entrepreneurial freedom, the right to property, and 
collective fundamental rights such as the right to 
access to a job centre, protection against unjustified 
dismissal, and the right to social security and assis-
tance – became part of the European economic con-
stitution and the model for a social market economy. 
 
politik für Europa. Festschrift für Hans von der Groeben zu seinem 
80. Geburtstag (Baden-Baden, 1987), 9–49 (17). 
7 European Communities, “Treaty on European Union 
Together with the Provisions Amending the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community with a View to Estab-
lishing the European Community”, Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Communities, no. C 224/01 (31 August 1992) Article 3a. 
8 See Florian Rödl, “Europäisches Verfassungsziel ‘soziale 
Marktwirtschaft’ – kritische Anmerkungen zu einem popu-
lären Modell”, Integration 28, no. 2 (2005): 150–61; Rutger 
Claassen et al., “Four Models of Protecting Citizenship and 
Social Rights in Europe: Conclusions to the Special Issue 
‘Rethinking the European Social Market Economy’”, Journal 
of Common Market Studies 57, no. 1 (2019): 159–74; Christian 
Joerges and Florian Rödl, “Social Market Economy” as Europe’s 
Social Model? EUI Working Paper Law no. 2004/8 (Florence: 
European University Institute [EUI], 2004). 
Many fundamental economic policy 
decisions and structures in Europe 
can be traced back to regulatory 
policy ideas of the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
The shaping of the European economic consti-
tution was influenced by the ideas9 of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, especially those of Walter 
Eucken and the Freiburg School. To this day, ordo-
liberal principles and structural decisions can be seen 
in day-to-day European economic policy decisions, for 
example in the measures that the EU has been using 
in response to the deep crisis in the euro zone since 
2011.10 
With the process of European integration and the 
penetration of national economic systems by European 
legislation, the scope for differences in national eco-
nomic constitutions has become noticeably narrower.11 
European fundamental freedoms in the internal mar-
ket, supranational competition, and state aid law and 
Community regulations set the framework for national 
economic policies and economic constitutions.12 
The limits of European primary law 
Nevertheless, European economic policy is still domi-
nated and determined by EU member states. Like the 
 
9 The main elements include a property system that guar-
antees private property, a monetary policy that ensures the 
stability of the currency, and a competition policy that allows 
the free play of market forces. See also Jens van Scherpen-
berg, “Ordnungspolitischer Konflikt im Binnenmarkt”, in 
Europäische Integration, ed. Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate 
Kohler-Koch (Opladen, 1996), 345–72. 
10 See Mark Schieritz, “Deutscher Sonderweg? Ökono-
mische Grundannahmen der Politik in Deutschland”, in 
Die Zukunft der Eurozone. Wie wir den Euro retten und Europa 
zusammenhalten, ed. Alexander Schellinger and Philipp Stein-
berg (Bielefeld, 2016), 75–87; Peter Nedergaard, “The Ordo-
liberalisation of the European Union?”, Journal of European 
Integration 42, no. 2 (2020): 213–30. 
11 See Matthias Ruffert, “Zur Leistungsfähigkeit der Wirt-
schaftsverfassung”, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 134, no. 2 
(2009) 2, 197–239; Stefan Griller, “Wirtschaftsverfassung 
und Binnenmarkt”, in Economic Constitution and Internal Mar-
ket. Studies in Honour of Heinz-Peter Rill’s 70th birthday, ed. idem 
et al. (Vienna, 2010), 1–47. 
12 See David Jungbluth, “Transforming the Basic Law Eco-
nomic Constitution through European Union Law”, European 
Law 45, no. 4 (2010): 471–89. 
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founding European treaties, the Treaty of Lisbon – 
in Article 119 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) – speaks only of “close 
coordination of member states’ economic policies”, 
based on “the internal market and the definition of 
common objectives”. The member states are to regard 
their economic policies as “a matter of common con-
cern” (Article 121 TFEU) and direct them towards 
common objectives. 
The European treaties do not provide 
for supranational economic policy. 
European primary law clearly provides no legal 
base for supranational economic policy-making. The 
member states have so far always rejected any trans-
fer of economic, employment, or social policy com-
petences to the EU that would go beyond the present 
level and allow the harmonisation or centralisation 
of policies. The obvious contradiction between the 
retention of national sovereignty and the need for 
Community action on these very policies is to be 
resolved by the softer method of policy coordination. 
Consequently, the responsibilities for economic 
policy-making are those that have either been trans-
ferred only in part to the EU or remain entirely with-
in the competence of the member states. In any case, 
equipping the EU with the appropriate political and 
legislative instruments to implement an efficient and 
coherent economic policy has its limits in the division 
of competences between the EU and member states. 
Thus, the EU is denied a central instrument of national 
economic policy: the levying of taxes or the modifica-
tion of existing tax rates. As a result, an important 
channel for influencing the price mechanism in the 
European internal market is lost.13 The few tax policy 
competences of the EU in the field of indirect taxa-
tion are primarily intended to ensure equality of com-
petition and compliance with the prohibition of 
discrimination in the European internal market. The 
consensus-based harmonisation of indirect taxation is 
only possible “to the extent that such harmonisation 
is necessary to ensure the establishment and func-
tioning of the internal market and to avoid distor-
tions of competition” (Article 113 TFEU). Although 
 
13 Articles 110 to 113 TFEU relate only to indirect taxes; 
Article 114(2) TFEU allows harmonisation of legislation on 
turnover taxes, excise duties and other indirect taxes only 
under a special legislative procedure, i.e. by unanimity in 
the Council. 
the harmonisation of direct taxes, in particular cor-
porate tax, and the establishment of a uniform basis 
of assessment have also been discussed for several 
decades, the Commission has not yet reached a con-
sensus on the need to harmonise indirect taxes. How-
ever, these initiatives are also limited to the objective 
of ensuring the equality of competition in the internal 
market. A genuine economic governance effect with a 
Community tax policy has so far played only a minor 
role in these debates. 
Internal market, competition policy, and 
monetary union 
From the outset, European integration was intended 
to create a common market for goods, labour, capital, 
and services with a level playing field and the establish-
ment of a customs union. Both were to be achieved 
through a policy of legislative approximation and 
standardisation. Harmonisation covers framework 
conditions, production, and product specifications, 
but also the rights and their protection of market 
participants, which are addressed, for example, by 
consumer and labour protection legislation. Because 
of the large number of national laws to be harmo-
nised in addition to the technical and administrative 
obstacles, the principle of harmonisation was supple-
mented by the principle of mutual recognition at the 
end of the 1980s in the course of the European Com-
mission’s internal market programme and the Single 
European Act. The regulation of the internal market 
and its four market freedoms by means of European 
legislation is still the central economic policy instru-
ment of the EU today. It is also intended to achieve 
economic convergence. 
The common economic area can only function in 
the long term if restrictions of competition by com-
panies or public authorities are eliminated.14 As a 
supranational institution committed to the European 
common good, the European Commission acts as the 
European competition authority – irrespective of the 
national or regional interests of the member states. It 
is responsible for the competition law categories laid 
down in European primary law, namely the prohibi-
tion of cartels; other restrictive measures or agree-
ments; mergers and abuse of a dominant market posi-
tion; as well as for monitoring the basic ban on state 
 
14 Anna Gerbrandy, “Rethinking Competition Law within 
the European Economic Constitution”, Journal of Common Mar-
ket Studies 57, no. 1 (2019): 127–42. 
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aid and monitoring of public tenders. However, the 
strict European competition and state aid policy is 
in tension with other forms of European economic 
policy. This applies in particular to European support 
programmes for the agricultural sector and – with 
the help of the Structural Funds – for regions, to 
European industrial policy, but also to the special 
handling of services of general interest such as energy 
supply, telecommunications, and local public trans-
port. 
The Maastricht Treaty set a constitutional objective 
of economic integration that went beyond the single 
market: the creation of the European Economic and 
Monetary Union. A supranational monetary and 
exchange rate policy in the euro zone was intended 
to complement and enhance the EU’s more narrowly 
focussed economic policy, which was geared towards 
completing the single market. Even in the run-up to 
the Maastricht negotiations, there had been intense 
and controversial debate about whether a common 
economic policy was indispensable for the stability 
and functioning of monetary union. Finally, it was 
agreed that the necessary economic convergence in 
the euro area would be achieved through a deeper 
economic policy coordination of national policies. 
The transfer of competences and responsibilities for 
monetary policy to supranational bodies was delib-
erately not reflected in economic policy. In contrast to 
the scope and objectives of the single market-related 
European economic policy, supranational monetary 
and exchange rate policy is primarily geared to macro-
economic and macro-financial aspects: The member 
states must keep their national public budgets per-
manently stable and are obliged to avoid excessive 
public deficits. 
The two elements of European Economic and 
Monetary Union – economic policy on the one 
hand, and monetary and exchange rate policy on the 
other – are therefore different. There are consider-
able differences both in terms of their binding force 
under primary law and in terms of the political and 
legal instruments available to the EU and its insti-
tutions. This discrepancy has consequences: for the 
scope of member states’ fiscal policy and the EU’s 
ability to exert influence.15 
 
15 In view of the special monetary and fiscal policy starting 
points and framework conditions for member states in the 
euro zone, the extensive and far-reaching political and scien-
tific debate on the need for reform and options in the euro 
zone – ranging from European bonds or a state insolvency 
European economic process policy 
Although the EU’s legislative powers in the field of 
economic policy are clearly limited by primary law, 
the EU and its institutions have developed a compre-
hensive and far-reaching economic process policy – 
with an only modest set of instruments, which is also 
limited in its scope.16 
Instruments 
The policy is not entirely outside the EU’s compe-
tence. The role and influence of the European institu-
tions in supporting instruments such as the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines (Article 121 TFEU) are laid 
down in the treaty; but the European Commission in 
particular can develop its own ideas on the topics and 
objectives of coordination, and thus set its own prior-
ities as an agenda setter.17 In principle, the EU has the 
following four instruments at its disposal for shaping 
a European economic process policy. 
Legislation and regulation of the 
internal market 
The EU can regulate the internal market with Euro-
pean legislation, albeit not fully and completely 
autonomously. Legislation harmonising national 
regulations and European competition and state aid 
law are of particular importance in this respect. In 
addition, the Union has powers for certain sectors, 
such as agricultural and fisheries policy, energy 
policy, transport policy with trans-European net-
works, and related policy areas such as consumer 
protection and environmental policy. 
The EU’s regulatory activity can open up new 
markets for the internal market and European com-
petition or expand existing ones. The Services Direc-
tive for the services sector, the Capital Market Union 
for the financial markets, initiatives in traffic and 
transport policy, the energy sector and public resp. 
 
in the euro zone to ways and forms of a European fiscal 
union – is not intended to be deepened further here. 
16 An adaptation of the European economic constitution 
would require difficult negotiations to change the European 
treaties, which are not currently on the agenda. Therefore, 
the focus of the analysis below is on the EU’s economic pro-
cess policy; for the sake of simplicity, the terms “economic 
process”, “economic policy-making”, and “economic policy” 
are used synonymously. 
17 See Sebastiaan Princen, Agenda-setting in the European 
Union (Basingstoke, 2009). 
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universal services are well-known examples. The EU 
is now also aiming for a single European market for 
data, given the growing importance of digitisation.18 
The opening of markets to free competition, that 
is, deregulation, often entails both the possibility and 
necessity of re-regulation. This means more than mere 
legislation. Specifically, it involves setting limits or 
standards, monitoring them and, where appropriate, 
imposing sanctions in the event of non-compliance, 
and creating or establishing appropriate procedures 
and institutions – in other words, clearly the exercis-
ing of an economic process policy. 
Enforcement of European competition policy 
As the European Commission is the European com-
petition authority, it can intervene in the market by 
specifying the competition and state aid requirements 
of European contract law, regulating implementation, 
and monitoring compliance. The Directorate-General 
for Competition is responsible for the preparation 
and processing of specific competition-related cases 
and for the investigation, evaluation, and preparation 
of decisions such as fines, merger prohibitions, and 
company splits.  
The Commission cooperates closely with the 
national competition authorities in a European Com-
petition Network and usually intervenes only when a 
potential infringement of European competition law 
affects several member states or companies in several 
member states.19 However, the Commission is em-
powered to assume jurisdiction in an individual case 
and submit opinions to the national courts on its own 
initiative if it has concerns about the interpretation 
of national authorities. Its interpretation of how Euro-
pean competition and state aid law should be applied 
and the case law of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) can guide decisions at the national level. It also 
provides guidance on areas of application of Euro-
pean competition law in order to ensure consistency 
in the application of the law and the conformity of 
 
18 European Commission, Shaping Europe’s Digital Future, 
COM(2020) 67 final (Brussels, 19 February 2020). 
19 See Council of the European Union, “Regulation No 1/ 
2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the 
Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty”, Official Journal of the European Communities, no. L 1/1 
(4 January 2003): 1–25 (Articles 81 f. of the EC Treaty cor-
respond in TFEU to Articles 101 f.). 
decisions on competition law with judgments of the 
ECJ.20 
Community objectives and policy 
coordination 
In areas where there is no legally binding regulation, 
the EU nevertheless has the possibility of influencing 
the framework, priorities, and measures of member 
states’ economic policies. By proposing common 
objectives at the European level that are accepted and 
implemented by the member states, the EU can set 
politically binding priorities and guidelines. However, 
implementation and, in some areas, the choice of 
appropriate measures will remain the responsibility 
of the member states. Economic policy coordination 
involves competition between countries to find the 
best way to achieve the commonly agreed objectives, 
promoting mutual learning between member states, 
and comparing national policies and models. The EU, 
usually the European Commission, may also be man-
dated by the member states to monitor and, if neces-
sary, sanction compliance with – and implementa-
tion of – commonly agreed objectives and targets. It 
can thus at least indirectly influence economic devel-
opments in the EU and the member states and exer-
cise some economic policy control. 
Financial incentives and conditionalities 
The EU has a small budget compared to member 
states’ budgets, and its autonomy in using these 
financial resources is limited. However, it can provide 
effective start-up financing through its own funds and 
investment or support programmes, and it can com-
bine this with conditions for implementing policies 
and objectives. 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the oldest, 
best-known, and most criticised EU support policy for 
a specific sector of the European internal market.21 
For the so-called first pillar of the CAP – direct pay-
ments to farmers and market support measures – a 
total of €278 billion (at 2011 prices) has been ear-
 
20 See, e.g., European Commission, “Guidelines on the 
Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to Horizontal Cooperation Agree-
ments”, Official Journal of the European Union, no. C11/1 (14 
January 2011): 1–72. 
21 The objectives and tasks of this policy, which are set out 
in Article 39 TFEU, include increasing productivity and per 
capita income in agriculture, stabilising markets for agricul-
tural products and, finally, ensuring a cost-effective supply 
of agricultural products. 
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marked for the current financial period 2014 to 2020. 
The second major area of expenditure from the EU 
budget comprises the European Cohesion Funds and 
Structural Funds; in the current funding period, a 
total of €325 billion is available to boost growth and 
employment.22 If the necessary national co-financing 
is added, these funds provide the EU with a powerful 
economic policy instrument worth around €650 bil-
lion. 
In addition, the EU has the possibility to co-deter-
mine member state and regional funding priorities 
through the specific legislation and its Cohesion 
Policy steering and planning documents. A “paradigm 
shift” has taken place: away from transfers and their 
distribution, and towards growth and results-oriented 
investments.23 There is no doubt that European Co-
hesion Policy and the Structural Funds have now 
become the main financial instrument of European 
economic policy. The EU offers similar incentives to 
other sectors of the economy, either directly through 
the creation of favourable framework conditions, or 
through accompanying member state policies. There 
are, for example, programmes to build up and expand 
infrastructure; promote individual industrial sectors, 
especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); 
support innovation and research; in addition to edu-
cation policy support programmes. 
With the help of its own institutions, such as the 
European Investment Bank (EIB), the Union can also 
supplement its financial incentive policy with loans 
and guarantees. 
 
22 European Commission, Strategic Report 2019 on the 
Implementation of the European Structural and Investment Funds, 
COM(2019) 627 final (Brussels, 17 December 2019). 
23 Walter Deffaa, “The New Generation of Structural and 
Investment Funds – More than Financial Transfers?” Inter-
economics 51, no. 3 (2016): 155–63. 
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The EU’s economic policy instruments therefore con-
sist primarily of policy coordination and coordination 
of the economic policies of the member states. The 
European Commission can only fulfil this task, which 
is laid down in the European treaties, after first en-
suring that there is a common understanding of the 
economic challenges that the member states want, or 
should, tackle together and which political objectives 
are derived from this assessment. 
With the help of strategies and guidelines drawn 
up and agreed upon for this purpose, the EU, and 
in particular the European Commission, is perfectly 
capable of influencing the economic policies of the 
member states. In agreement with the member states, 
it can define the objectives of – and priorities for – 
their economic policies, set or change the framework 
conditions, and monitor compliance with the prin-
ciples laid down in the European economic constitu-
tion: the safeguarding of free and unrestricted com-
petition in the common market. 
Regulation of the internal market 
The internal market is at the heart of economic inte-
gration, and thus also of European economic policy.24 
Around 520 million people currently live in the 
enlarged internal market. As this integration project 
is never complete, the internal market must be con-
tinuously adapted and developed to meet the chal-
lenges of a changing environment and new circum-
 
24 Beyond the 27 member states, Liechtenstein, Norway, 
and Iceland are additional three de facto members of the 
internal market, while Switzerland is closely linked and 
largely integrated through a large number of bilateral agree-
ments. Future relations with the United Kingdom and the 
connection to the internal market are still open. 
stances.25 Its economic and political importance is 
immense; it is “one of the greatest achievements of 
the European project [...] it has been instrumental in 
increasing the prosperity and wealth of the citizens 
of the European Union”.26 
With the economic power of the 
internal market, the EU is able 
to externalise its own 
standards, norms, and rules. 
This economic power of the internal market en-
ables the EU to externalise its own standards, norms, 
and rules and enforce them globally.27 With its com-
petition policy in particular, the EU can achieve inter-
national regulation that extends beyond the Com-
munity on the basis of European competition law28 
and – using the “Brussels effect” smartly – triggers 
a real race to the top in the competition for standards in 
consumer and labour protection as well as in social, 
environmental, and employment policy. This global 
expansion of high European standards and require-
 
25 Therefore the frequently used phrase “completion of 
the internal market” is wrong and misleading. 
26 European Commission, The Single Market in a Changing 
World. A Unique Asset in Need of Renewed Political Commitment, 
COM (2018) 772 final (Brussels, 22 November 2018), 1. 
27 Sandra Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig, “EU Rules 
beyond EU Borders: Theorizing External Governance in Euro-
pean Politics”, Journal of European Public Policy 16, no. 6 (2009): 
791–812; Anu Bradford, “Exporting Standards: The Exter-
nalization of the EU’s Regulatory Power via Markets”, Inter-
national Review of Law and Economics 42 (2015), https://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2770661; idem, “The 
Brussels Effect”, Northwestern University Law Review 107, no. 1 
(2012): 1–67 (3). 
28 Dominique Sinopoli and Kai Peter Purnhagen, “Reversed 
Harmonization or Horizontalization of EU Standards? Does 
WTO Law Facilitate or Constrain the Brussels Effect?” Wis-
consin International Law Journal 34, no. 1 (2016): 92–119. 
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ments could be successful primarily if the EU reacts 
quickly, distinctly, and in a strictly regulatory manner 
to attempts by global competitors – but also Euro-
pean suppliers – undermining EU rules. 
Digital policy is a good example of the new regula-
tory tasks. When innovation creates new markets, the 
EU is called upon to draft directives and regulations 
for the internal market and access to it. The regula-
tion of the data markets in particular shows the scope 
for regulation, which goes hand in hand with the EU’s 
immense market power. The General Data Protection 
Regulation is certainly the best-known example of 
“Europe’s regulatory model” and acts as a “strong 
reference point for many outside Europe”.29 With the 
new digital and data strategy, the Commission also 
aims to reinforce “Europe’s ability to define its own 
rules and values in the digital age”.30  
The EU also has a similar level of market and regu-
latory power concerning high product standards and 
environmental protection laws.31 Against the back-
ground of global trade conflicts and its ambitious 
climate and sustainability objectives, the EU is also 
working on adapting its strategic planning docu-
ments, agendas, action plans, as well as the objectives 
and measures set out in these in order to increase its 
ability to externalise European standards. The politi-
cal use of the “Brussels effect” now extends beyond 
the mere protection of European consumers and 
producers and increasingly endeavours to extend 
European values, political objectives, and global 
standards, such as the protection of universal human 
rights as well as environmental and climate protec-
tion measures. As part of the European Green Deal, 
the Commission intends to encourage the EU’s inter-
national partners in the future “to design similar 
rules that are as ambitious as the EU’s rules, thus 
facilitating trade and enhancing environment pro-
tection and climate mitigation in these countries”.32 
The European internal market is increasingly devel-
 
29 European Commission, A Connected Digital Single Market 
for All, COM (2017) 228 final (Brussels, 10 May 2017), 22. 
30 Idem, Shaping Europe’s Digital Future (see note 18), 2. 
31 Katharina Holzinger and Thomas Sommerer, “‘Race to 
the Bottom’ or ‘Race to Brussels’? Environmental Competi-
tion in Europe”, Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 2 
(2011): 315–39. 
32 European Commission, The European Green Deal, 
COM(2019) 640 final (Brussels, 11 December 2019), 21. 
oping to serve the EU’s value-based international 
policies and interests.33 
EU member states benefit from the internal market 
and Customs Union in two ways: through the advan-
tages of trade with third countries and through the 
benefits for their own economies. On the one hand, 
the common market provides external security and 
strengthens the position of member states in global 
competition. On the other hand, various studies have 
shown that trade between countries in the internal 
market has also increased significantly, especially 
since the major enlargement round in 2004 with 
the accession of eight Central and Eastern European 
countries. The Commission calculates that the annual 
benefit from integration into the internal market for 
the EU-27 member states is almost 6 per cent of gross 
national income (GNI), or €923.6 billion.34 Although 
the studies evaluated by the Commission show that 
the positive effects of market integration are unevenly 
distributed between member states and regions, they 
nevertheless show that the internal market is worth-
while for all member states. 
The alignment of the regulatory 
density and depth of the four market 
freedoms is an ongoing task. 
There are also differences in the density and depth 
of regulations, both in terms of the four market free-
doms of the internal market as well as public procure-
 
33 David Bach and Abraham L. Newman, “The European 
Regulatory State and Global Public Policy: Micro-institutions, 
Macro-influence”, Journal of European Public Policy 14, no. 6 
(2007): 827–46. 
34 The Commission draws on three recent studies and 
calculates an average value from their results. See European 
Commission, The Performance of the Single Market for Goods after 
25 Years. Final Report (Luxembourg, July 2019). The underly-
ing studies calculate a positive internal market effect for 
the EU-27 ranging from around 3.7 per cent of GNI or €530 
billion (Bertelsmann Foundation) to 9.1 per cent of GNI or 
€1,500 billion (in ‘t Veld). See the studies of: Jan in ‘t Veld, 
Quantifying the Economic Effects of the Single Market in a Structural 
Macromodel, European Economy Discussion Paper no. 94 
(Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 
2019); Gabriel Felbermayr, Jasmin Gröschl and Inga Heiland, 
Undoing Europe in a Quantitative Trade Model, IFO Working 
Paper 250 (Munich: ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Eco-
nomic Research at the University of Munich, January 2018); 
Giordano Mion and Dominic Ponattu, Estimating Economic 
Benefits of the Single Market for European Countries and Regions, 
Policy Paper (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann-Stiftung, May 2019). 
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ment. Divergences still exist between markets for goods 
and services, and these are reflected in the volume of 
intra-European trade. Whereas the internal market 
for services in the EU-28 was responsible for an aver-
age of 4.7 per cent of GNI in 2017, the exchange of 
goods contributed 19.6 per cent to GNI.35 
The transposition of internal market directives into 
national law is of great importance for the legal cer-
tainty of all market participants. According to a list36 
drawn up by the European Commission, by 1 Novem-
ber 2019 a total of 1,083 internal market directives37 
had been adopted that were – or are still to be – 
transposed by national legislators.38 The Commission 
regularly monitors compliance with the transposition 
deadlines, because if European legislation is not trans-
posed within the prescribed time frame or is transposed 
incompletely, the internal market gradually loses 
coherence and significance. The Commission sets 
margins and publishes the results in an annual score-
board.39 Only a maximum of 0.5 per cent of EU in-
ternal market legislation in individual member states 
is not transposed, or transposed too late or incom-
pletely.40 The Commission’s Internal Market Score-
board 2020 provides an overview of the state of the 
transposition of directives in the individual member 
states, and the degree of openness and integration of 
the markets for 2019, showing that the average EU 
transposition deficit was 0.6 per cent of all directives, 
 
35 European Commission, Single Market Scoreboard 2019 – 
Trade in Goods and Services, https://ec.europa.eu/internal_ 
market/scoreboard/integration_market_openness/trade_ 
goods_services/index_en.htm (accessed 13 August 2020). 
36 The list is available at: https://ec.europa.eu/internal_ 
market/score/docs/relateddocs/20191101/im_directive_de.pdf 
(accessed 8 August 2020). 
37 The Commission includes all directives that, under 
Articles 26 and 114 TFEU, can have an impact on the four 
freedoms of the internal market, as well as on employment, 
taxation, social policy, education, culture and media, public 
health, energy, consumer protection, and the environment. 
38 The deadline for transposition of the latest listed In-
ternal Market Directive No. 2019/1158 of 20 June 2019 on 
reconciliation of professional and private life for parents 
and carers is 2 August 2022. 
39 The European Commission publishes compilations at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/ (accessed 
8 August 2020). 
40 The widening of the tolerated transposition deficit from 
1.5 per cent at the beginning of the millennium to 0.5 per 
cent corresponded to the steady, albeit slow, improvement in 
the transposition rates of EU internal market legislation into 
national law. 
with an average delay of 11.5 months; the conformity 
deficit was 1.2 per cent.41 The latter refers to the differ-
ence between de jure and de facto transposition. One 
indicator of this disparity is the infringement proceed-
ings that the Commission launches against a member 
state for the incorrect transposition of a directive. 
Although the number of proceedings recently has in-
creased slightly, in the long term it has been reduced 
from a peak in 2007/08. 
A decade ago, Mario Monti had already made pro-
posals for adapting the single market to new eco-
nomic, employment, and sustainability challenges in 
a report named after him.42 The Commission responded 
with a number of initiatives.43 These strategies with 
packages of measures to further develop the single 
market were followed by sector-specific and market-
opening legislative proposals for an Energy Union, 
a Banking Union, and a Capital Market Union. This 
essentially horizontal approach of the Commission is 
complemented by analyses and strategies for individ-
ual sectors of the economy, ranging from the auto-
motive, space, and chemical industries to the social 
economy.44 With this sectoral approach accompany-
ing the policy, the Commission is attempting to focus 
more strongly on the horizontal objectives of competi-
tiveness and the capacity for innovation and adap-
tation of a common internal market policy. 
Member states took up the Commission’s proposals 
and sought to integrate the wide range of initiatives, 
strategies, action plans, and individual measures into 
an overall coherent strategic economic policy ap-
 
41 European Commission, Single Market Scoreboard 2020. 
The report is available at: https://ec.europa.eu/internal_ 
market/scoreboard/performance_overview/index_en.htm 
(accessed 8 August 2020). 
42 Mario Monti, A New Strategy for the Internal Market (Brus-
sels, 9 May 2010). However, Monti’s report had also identi-
fied an integration and market fatigue: “The Internal Market 
is now more unpopular than ever, yet Europe needs it more 
than ever.” 
43 European Commission, Single Market Act. Twelve Levers 
to Deliver Growth and Confidence – Together for New Growth, 
COM(2011) 206 final (Brussels, 13 April 2011); idem, Single 
Market Act II. Together for New Growth, COM(2012) 573 final 
(Brussels, 3 October 2012); idem, Upgrading the Single Market: 
More Opportunities for People and Business, COM(2015) 550 final 
(Brussels, 28 October 2015). 
44 The European initiatives in particular sectors are avail-
able at: European Commission, Internal Market, Industry, Entre-
preneurship and SMEs, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors_de 
(accessed 8 August 2020). 
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proach. The spring European Council on 21–22 
March 2019 identified the deepening of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union and the internal 
market, a strong industrial policy, a forward-looking 
digital policy, and an ambitious and robust trade 
policy as elements of this “integrated approach”.45 
Competition law and industrial policy 
In the field of industrial policy, the European Com-
mission is also focussing on the development of 
strategies to arrive at a common understanding of 
future guidance and challenges. A paper that was 
presented in 2017 to prepare the EU for the “new 
industrial age” and launch a “holistic and forward-
looking vision for Europe’s industry”46 was followed 
by a proposal for such a vision in 2020. In the coming 
decade, the sector must become greener, more sus-
tainable, and digital, all while maintaining its global 
competitiveness and social sustainability. As with 
its previous strategy papers, the Commission avoids 
direct intervention and limits itself to improving the 
economic framework conditions for industrial enter-
prises and accompanying activities. The aim is to 
support the digitisation of industry and the internal 
market, and to promote initiatives to achieve climate 
neutrality and a CO2-saving recycling economy. 
Through industrial innovation and the expansion of 
research and development programmes, Europe’s 
industrial and strategic autonomy is to be strengthened 
and the development of key technologies supported. 
In addition to these IPCEI (Important Projects of Com-
mon European Interest) – for example in robotics 
and microelectronics as well as biomedicine and 
nanotechnologies – European value chains or “in-
dustrial ecosystems” should be developed. The use of 
foreign direct investment should be examined more 
closely than in the past.47 With this new strategy, the 
Commission confirms its more business-supporting 
and framework-based approach to influence Euro-
pean industrial policy by agreeing on common objec-
tives. For key technologies only, the Commission 
 
45 European Council, Conclusions of the European Council (21 
and 22 March 2019) (Brussels, 22 March 2019), points 2 et seq. 
46 European Commission, Investing in a Smart, Innovative and 
Sustainable Industry. A Renewed EU Industrial Policy, COM(2017) 
479 final (Brussels, 13 September 2017), 5. 
47 Idem, A New Industrial Strategy for Europe, COM(2020) 102 
final (Brussels, 10 March 2020), 1. 
proposes individual measures to provide an impetus 
or incentive, such as investment in the development 
of batteries to meet low-emission mobility targets. 
In addition, some member states support EU indus-
trial policy measures. Following a French initiative, 
a group of 20 member states has been meeting regu-
larly since 2013 to coordinate their national industrial 
policies as “Friends of Industry” and agree on com-
mon objectives and measures. The member states 
have now agreed on agenda-setting objectives for the 
internal market and a European industrial policy, as 
well as measures to boost the growth and competi-
tiveness of the European economy. In addition, there 
were initiatives to modernise European competition 
policy and develop accompanying policies, such as 
education and research policy, support for SMEs, and 
measures to promote sustainability and climate pro-
tection. 
In principle, European industrial policy creates 
opportunities to intervene in existing or emerging 
product markets – and is thus inevitably subject to 
tensions with European competition, anti-trust, and 
state aid law and the European rules on public pro-
curement, which are monitored by the Commission. 
The Commission’s neutrality – or that of the respon-
sible Directorate-General for Competition – ensures 
that decisions are accepted and thus applied. The 
Commission is extremely positive about its work: 
“The predictability and credibility of the EU’s system 
has made the Commission one of the leading and 
most influential competition authorities in the 
world.”48 
A reform of competition 
policy should make “European 
champions” possible. 
However, Germany, France, and Poland are now 
questioning the Commission’s prominent role as a 
competition authority and calling for a comprehen-
sive reform of European competition policy. New 
global challenges require: 
a) an adjustment to the changing international com-
petition in which those companies, in particular 
from China, with state support may distort fair 
competition; 
 
48 Idem, Report on Competition Policy 2018, COM(2019) 339 
final (Brussels, 15 July 2019), 1. 
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b) a greater consideration of the impact of digitisation 
on product and service markets.49 
In summer 2019, the German, French, and Polish 
ministries of economic affairs presented proposals – 
Berlin linked its initiative for a national Industrial 
Strategy 2030 to the European debate.50 The three 
ministers called on the Commission to modernise its 
guidelines for mergers in order to be better able to 
deal with takeover attempts by state-controlled com-
panies from third countries in the European mar-
ket, and to examine more efficiently and quickly 
whether – and to what extent – large international 
tech groups are abusing their dominant positions. By 
merging European companies, they want to enable 
the creation of “European champions” in order to 
remain globally competitive.51 The three member 
states also called for a political assessment of issues 
regarding competition law. In the Competitiveness 
Council (COMPET) the ministers should be able to dis-
cuss and influence the Commission’s actions, down 
to the level of individual decisions, and even annul 
decisions if necessary. The aim of this trio-initiative is, 
in addition to responding to the new global challeng-
es facing European competition policy, to limit the 
Commission’s dominant role in the interpretation 
and application of competition law. However, this 
objective is by no means shared by all member states. 
The Dutch government, for example, in a separate 
position paper, advocates maintaining and further 
strengthening the political neutrality and independ-
ence of European competition policy.52 The far-reach-
 
49 Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and Heike 
Schweitzer, Competition Policy for a Digital Era (Luxembourg, 
2019); Oliver Budzinski and Annika Stöhr, “Competition 
Policy Reform in Europe and Germany – Institutional 
Change in the Light of Digitization”, European Competition 
Journal 15, no. 1 (2019): 15–54. 
50 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, 
Modernising EU Competition Policy, available at: https://www. 
bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/M-O/modernising-eu-
competition-policy.html (accessed 9 August 2020). 
51 The merger plans of Siemens and Alstom in the rail 
transport sector were justified with this argument; the com-
petitor was the Chinese manufacturer China Railway Rolling 
Stock Corporation, which was created from the merger of 
the two state-owned companies CSR and CNR. See European 
Political Strategy Centre, EU Industrial Policy after Siemens-
Alstom. Finding a New Balance between Openness and Protection 
(Brussels, 18 March 2019). 
52 Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the 
European Union, Non-paper – Strengthening the Level Playing 
Field on the Internal Market (Brussels, 9 December 2019), https:// 
ing objectives of the trio and the criticism of the Com-
mission will therefore have to be discussed further 
among the member states. 
In addition, the application of European competi-
tion law by the Commission and the national com-
petition authorities, as well as its interpretation by 
the ECJ, is by no means purely inflexible or unadapt-
able and, as claimed, has left the changing political 
environment unrecognised. Instead, general econom-
ic policy objectives are also taken into account; there 
is therefore room for adjustments and policy changes. 
In particular, the European Commission’s greater 
consideration of economic and consumer protection 
concerns and consequences in the application and 
interpretation of European competition law, which 
has remained virtually unchanged, has led since the 
1990s to an “economic approach” to European – and 
subsequently also member state – competition law 
and its application.53 
Strategic planning and economic 
policy coordination 
The EU has only limited scope for economic policy 
regulation. As a driving force and agenda setter, it – 
and in particular the European Commission – must 
try to commit the member states to common objec-
tives in the course of economic policy coordination. 
European economic process policy therefore usually 
begins with the preparation of planning and strategy 
documents, which helps to bring the different ap-
proaches of member states closer together. The aim 
is to develop a common understanding of problems, 
challenges, and objectives. In the best case, this process 
ends with the agreement of a coordinated sequence 
of steps for Community reactions and measures. The 
main purpose of these planning and strategy docu-
ments is thus to define and specify the matters of 
common interest identified in Article 121 TFEU and, 
in the course of coordination, to derive the appropri-
ate measures for the economic policies of member 
states. 
 
www.permanentrepresentations.nl/documents/publications/ 
2019/12/09/non-paper-on-level-playing-field (accessed 9 August 
2020). 
53 See, e.g., Anne C. Witt, “The European Court of Justice 
and the More Economic Approach to EU Competition Law – 
Is the Tide Turning?” The Antitrust Bulleting 64, no. 2 (2019): 
172–213. 
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The EU’s economic policy strategies 
provide the reference framework for 
coordination between member states. 
Since the 1990s, the Commission has endeavoured 
to develop the economic process policy for which it is 
responsible and to make it more effective and target-
oriented.54 Since 2000, it has used multi-annual growth 
strategies, starting with the so-called Lisbon Strategy,55 
which was replaced by the Europe 2020 strategy in 
2010. The strategies have provided the reference 
framework for the coordination of all strategic initia-
tives and the many economic policy coordination 
processes that have been launched in the EU. With 
these 10-year strategies, the Commission succeeded 
in circumventing the limits of its influence on the 
economic, employment, and social policies of the 
member states, which are anchored in primary law: 
The real political value of the strategies was that they 
provided new instruments for economic policy-mak-
ing agreed between the Commission and the member 
states. The real task was not the implementation of 
the reform objectives, but the development of an ever 
closer, more efficient, and then sanctions-based co-
ordination process.56 The Europe 2020 strategy also 
made use of this soft form of economic policy-
making. However, the focus shifted to fundamental 
macroeconomic issues to stabilise the euro area. To 
this end, the open method of coordination was re-
placed by a new coordination instrument: the “Euro-
pean Semester”. 
The Juncker Commission refrained from present-
ing a new 10-year economic policy strategy. The new 
European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen, 
however, took over this task with the European Green 
Deal. With this “new growth strategy” for the coming 
decade, it hopes to “develop the EU into a fair and 
 
54 Then various macroeconomic and employment policy 
coordination processes were established, such as the Luxem-
bourg process in the field of employment policy, the Cardiff 
process for improving competitiveness and structural eco-
nomic policy reforms, and the Cologne process for macro-
economic coordination. 
55 At their meeting in Lisbon in March 2000, EU leaders in 
the European Council committed themselves to the strategic 
goal of making the Union the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010 and to 
achieving full employment. 
56 See Peter Becker, “Integration ohne Plan – Die neue 
EU-Wachstumsstrategie ‘Europa 2020’”, Zeitschrift für Politik-
wissenschaft 21, no. 1 (2011): 67–91. 
prosperous society with a modern, resource-efficient 
and competitive economy”.57 
The European Semester 
Since 2011, the European Semester has been at the 
centre of economic policy coordination in order to 
more closely interlink the diverse coordination and 
agreement processes in the individual policy areas. 
It usually starts in November with the presentation 
of a comprehensive so-called autumn package.58 In 
the EU Annual Growth Report, the European Com-
mission analyses the economic situation in the EU 
and the euro area and presents its forecast for the 
following year, supplemented by draft reports on the 
implementation of the Broad Economic Policy Guide-
lines and the Employment Guidelines, as required 
by the TFEU. In addition, the Commission provides 
assessments of the member states’ stability and 
convergence programmes and, since 2012, an early 
warning report on their macroeconomic imbalances. 
On the basis of these analyses, the European Com-
mission proposes economic, employment, and social 
policy priorities for action for the EU and the euro 
area. The member states examine the proposals, in 
particular in the Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council (ECOFIN), the COMPET, and the Employment, 
Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council 
(EPSCO). Meanwhile, the Commission prepares the so-
called Winter Package: a separate country report for 
each member state in which it analyses and evaluates 
the economic, employment, social, and budgetary 
policy decisions and measures over the past year and 
compares them with the common European objec-
tives and the Union’s reform recommendations for 
member states. These recommendations for measures 
and reforms are derived from the progress or prob-
lems of the member states and presented by February 
of the following year. 
 
57 European Commission, The European Green Deal 
(see note 32), 2. 
58 For the current European Semester 2020, the new Euro-
pean Commission has changed the name to “Report on Sus-
tainable Growth”; see idem, Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 
2020, COM(2019) 650 final (Brussels, 17 December 2019). 
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The relevant Councils also examine and discuss 
this package and then submit their own assessments 
and recommendations for guidelines to the European 
Council. At their spring summit in March, the heads 
of state and government agree on economic and em-
ployment guidelines, which must then be implemented 
at the member state level, together with the country 
reports and the so-called Country-specific Recommen-
dations (CSRs). Member states draw up National 
Reform Programmes (NRPs) and, with regard to their 
budgetary policies, their stability and convergence 
programmes or, if they are not yet members of the 
euro area, convergence programmes on their medium-
term budgetary policy-making. In these programmes, 
they set out in detail the measures they plan to take, 
the objectives they want to achieve, and how they 
intend to remove obstacles to sustainable economic 
growth. These NRPs are thus the member states’ 
counterparts to the European recommendations for 
economic and employment structural reforms. They 
must be received by April by the Commission, which 
analyses and assesses them. The overall package of 
Commission forecasts and country reports, Council 
opinions, European Council guidelines, and National 
Reform and Stability or Convergence Programmes 
forms the basis for the CSRs. As precisely formulated 
guidance, they provide the member states with guide-
lines for continuing, intensifying, or refocussing their 
national structural reforms. The member states also 
examine and discuss these Commission recommenda-
tions in the Council formats involved and adopt the 
final reform recommendations by July – to be imple-
mented by the member states in the second half of 
the year, the national semester. The Commission’s 
next autumn package is then launched during the 
next cycle of the European Semester in November. 
The European Semester: 
fixed tasks, fixed procedures, 
modest progress so far. 
The European Semester is thus the organisational 
and administrative clamp with which the European 
initiatives and instruments for closer economic policy 
coordination have been held together, synchronised, 
and extended beyond the limited economic policy 
area since 2011. It provides the formal and substan-
tive framework for direct coordination and coopera-
tion between the European Commission and the gov-
ernments of the member states on almost all issues 
of financial, budgetary, economic, employment, and 
social policy.  
The country reports also encourage bilateral ex-
changes between the ministries concerned in the 
member states and the Commission services on indi-
cators, findings, and conclusions as well as on the 
necessary, possible, and promising structural reforms. 
The European Semester thus serves the development 
of the member states as well as the development of a 
common understanding of economic policy-making. 
However, the implementation of the CSRs has not 
been convincing so far.59 The evaluation annually 
presented by the Commission shows that since 2011, 
only 6 per cent of these recommendations have been 
 
59 Konstantinos Efstathiou and Guntram B. Wolff, Is the 
European Semester Effective and Useful? Policy Contribution no. 9 
(Brussels: Bruegel, 13 June 2018). 
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fully implemented, while 16 per cent have made con-
siderable progress; 5 per cent of the CSRs have not yet 
been tackled. The most serious desiderata were to be 
found in the areas of competition in the services sec-
tor and long-term sustainability of public finances 
(including pensions).60 The Commission also had to 
admit that in some cases “there is evidence of back-
tracking on elements of major reforms adopted in 
the past”.61 In principle, however, this list is purely 
statistical. It does not rank priorities or distinguish 
between more important from less urgent CSRs. 
For Germany, the Commission stated in its country 
report for 2020 that at least “some progress” had been 
made in 54 per cent of the reform recommendations, 
but only limited progress in 46 per cent. “Compared 
to 2014–2017, Germany’s implementation of CSRs 
has improved recently, though only to a limited 
extent, and is now roughly in line with the average 
progress made by other member states.”62 
Country-specific reform 
recommendations became de facto 
implementation guidelines. 
Although it is the European Council that takes 
note of the Commission’s analyses as well as growth 
and employment reports in the spring; formulates its 
own broad guidelines for the European Semester on 
this basis; and finally adopts the CSRs, the European 
Commission dominates the European Semester.63 The 
recommendations are proposed by the Commission, 
and the member states can only deviate from this 
line that the Commission proposes and push through 
changes in the Council if the latter approves the 
changes to the Commission proposal with a qualified 
majority. The comply or explain rule in particular makes 
it difficult for member states to simply reformulate, 
water down, or even delete the Commission’s CSR for-
mulations. According to this rule, the Council must 
 
60 European Commission, 2020 European Semester: Country-
specific Recommendations, COM(2020) 500 final (Brussels, 20 
May 2020). 
61 Idem, European Semester 2019: Country-specific Recommen-
dations, COM(2019) 500 final (Brussels, 5 June 2019), 3. 
62 Idem, Commission Staff Working Document. Country Report 
Germany 2020, SWD(2020)504 final (Brussels, 26 February 
2020), 15. 
63 See Reinout A. van der Verr and Markus Haverland, 
“Bread and Butter or Bread and Circuses? Politicisation and 
the European Commission in the European Semester”, Euro-
pean Union Politics 19, no. 3 (2018): 524–45. 
either adopt the Commission’s proposals or publicly 
explain and justify changes in a separate opinion.64 
This significantly enhances and strengthens the role 
of the Commission. Some observers speak of “small 
self-empowerment by the Commission”.65 Recom-
mendations have become de facto implementation 
guidelines for the member states. 
Thus, the European Semester first of all strength-
ens the role and influence of the European Commis-
sion in the intergovernmental coordination of eco-
nomic, fiscal, and employment policies of the member 
states.66 However, the Commission is relatively cau-
tious and reserved in its recommendations for those 
member states where the need for reform is great but 
the willingness to do so is, for a variety of reasons, low. 
If member states wish to influence the EU recom-
mendations under consideration, informal discus-
sions between the ministries of a national govern-
ment and the Commission prior to the adoption and 
publication of the recommendations are the most 
appropriate way to do so. The Semester therefore 
allows – and even forces – close coordination with 
the Commission. “Member states do not control the 
European Semester, nor have supranational institu-
tions become all-powerful.”67 Instead, a relatively effi-
cient interaction between the European and national 
executive authorities seems to be developing to tackle 
reforms and remove obstacles to reform in the com-
mon interest in the member states.  
Nevertheless, the role of the European Commission 
in this coordination process has been significantly 
enhanced. It can now influence and steer national 
economic policies – as the hub of economic policy 
 
64 European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union, “Regulation No 1175/2011 of 6 November 2011 
Amending Council Regulation No 1466/97 on the Strength-
ening of the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the 
Surveillance and Coordination of Economic Policies”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, no. L 306/12 (23 November 
2011): 12–24 (Article 2ab(2)). 
65 Michael W. Bauer and Stefan Becker, “The Unexpected 
Winner of the Crisis: The European Commission’s Strength-
ened Role in Economic Governance”, Journal of European Inte-
gration 36, no. 3 (2014): 213–29 (223). 
66 See Renauld Dehousse, “Why Has the EU Macroeconomic 
Governance Become More Supranational?” Journal of European 
Integration 38, no. 5 (2016): 617–31. 
67 Amy Verdun and Jonathan Zeitlin, “Introduction: 
The European Semester As a New Architecture of EU Socio-
economic Governance in Theory and Practice”, European 
Journal of Public Policy 25, no. 2 (2018): 137–48 (144). 
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coordination. The soft coordination that used to be 
based on Community targets and non-binding recom-
mendations is now giving way to a markedly stronger 
economic and reform policy-making with an increas-
ingly European character and with centralising and 
harmonising approaches. This trend will continue with 
the new growth strategy: the European Green Deal. 
Incentives through funding 
With the help of the European Semester, financial 
incentives through European funding policies serve as 
important supplements to European economic policy-
making. The Structural Funds are the focus here: For 
some years now, they have been slowly but increas-
ingly developing into an important economic policy 
steering instrument of the EU with a “clear invest-
ment strategy in every region”.68 The soft medium- to 
long-term goals of the 10-year growth strategies and 
the short-term reform priorities in the course of the 
European Semester can be tightened up with the in-
struments of conditionality.69 In the current Cohesion 
Policy funding period 2014 to 2020, this took the form 
of so-called macroeconomic conditionality. This form 
of conditionality, which is still highly controversial 
today, links the disbursement of money from the 
Structural Funds to compliance with the EU’s eco-
nomic policy guidelines and CSRs.70 The Commission 
can ask a member state to change its funding prior-
ities so that the European Structural Funds serve the 
common economic policy objectives and the imple-
mentation of CSRs in the context of the European 
Semester. It may also suspend all or part of the com-
mitments and payments of Structural Funds if a 
 
68 European Commission, Investing in Europe’s Future. Fifth 
Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion (Commission 
Report) (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European 
Union, 9 November 2010), 25. 
69 See Peter Becker, “Solidarité et conditionnalité: deux 
principes directeurs de la politique européenne de cohésion”, 
Revue française de finances publiques 141 (February 2018): 67–80. 
70 The European Commission had specified the provisions 
of Article 23 of the Regulation on European Structural and 
Investment Funds (ESI Regulation) in guidelines. See Euro-
pean Commission, Guidelines for the Application of Measures to 
Establish a Link between the Effectiveness of the European Structural 
and Investment Funds and Sound Economic Governance under Article 
23 of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013, COM(2014) 494 final (Brus-
sels, 30 July 2014). 
member state fails to comply with the guidelines and 
recommendations of economic policy coordination. 
The Structural Funds will 
increasingly serve an evolving 
European economic process policy. 
Additional strategic planning and control instru-
ments in the structural policy support programmes of 
the regions – such as the Common Strategic Frame-
work and the conclusion of Partnership Agreements 
between each member state and the European Com-
mission – also ensure that priorities, recommenda-
tions, and reform goals become binding guidelines 
beyond the division of competences in the European 
treaties. This form of “soft influence”71 enables the 
Commission to examine and enforce compliance with 
economic, financial, employment, budgetary, and 
social policy objectives and guidelines. The European 
Structural Funds no longer just serve to promote 
intra-European solidarity between prosperous and 
poorer regions, but are increasingly becoming policy-
making instruments of an evolving European eco-
nomic policy. This change in function is also evident 
in the fact that all regions in the EU are now eligible 
for funding, in principle. This steering or push-effect 
of European funding policy will be further enhanced 
in the funding period 2021 to 2027. The European 
Commission’s claim to control is becoming increas-
ingly apparent. 
European economic stabilisation policy: 
The EIB and the Juncker Plan for strategic 
investments 
Between 2007 and 2014, in response to the deep euro 
crisis, the volume of credits by development banks 
in the EU increased sharply. Both the EIB and the 
national development banks gained in importance as 
economic policy actors,72 as they took on the task of 
 
71 John Bachtler and Carlos Mendez, “Who Governs EU 
Cohesion Policy? Deconstructing the Reforms of the Struc-
tural Funds”, Journal of Common Market Studies 45, no. 3 (2007): 
535–64 (556). 
72 Daniel Mertens and Matthias Thiemann, “Building a 
Hidden Investment State? The European Investment Bank, 
National Development Banks and European Economic 
Governance”, Journal of European Public Policy 26, no. 1 (2019): 
23–43; idem, “Market-based but State-led: The Role of Pub-
lic Development Banks in Shaping Market-based Finance in 
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initiating an anti-cyclical economic policy by means of 
investment promotion.73 This made close cooperation 
between the EIB – which increased both its share capi-
tal and its investment capital – and the European 
Commission essential, “bringing the two institutions 
closer together”.74 
The Commission, under its then-President Jean-
Claude Juncker, pushed ahead with the EIB’s involve-
ment in its economic policy initiatives. With the 
European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) – 
the so-called Juncker Plan for Strategic Investments 
or as some observers put it, “Juncker’s new narrative 
regarding the importance of investment”75 – the 
focus was on a European investment offensive with 
stimulating financial incentives. The efforts to close 
the Europe-wide crisis-related investment gap without 
having to make excessive use of the EU budget were 
aimed at economic recovery, the creation of new jobs, 
and the development of European competitiveness. 
At the heart of this offensive was the EFSI, a joint 
and coordinated initiative of the European Commis-
sion and the EIB to mobilise private investment capi-
tal for strategic investment projects in the EU. How-
ever, it is not a fund at all, but an initial Union 
financial guarantee of €21 billion: €16 billion from 
the EU budget and another €5 billion from the EIB. 
The term of this loan guarantee was initially limited 
to three years. Thanks to these guarantees, the EIB 
expanded its business volume by around €61 billion, 
which in turn – including private capital – should 
result in a total investment volume of at least €315 
billion in the real economy over the three years. 
At the end of 2017, the Commission and the EIB 
extended their guarantees in the course of a first -
 
the European Union”, Competition & Change 22, no. 2 (2019): 
184–204. 
73 At the end of 2008, when the financial crisis started to 
spill over from the United States into the European Union 
economy, the Commission proposed a recovery plan: In addi-
tion to stimulus measures from the EU and member states 
totalling €200 billion, it called on the EIB to step up its inter-
ventions in the form of loans, equity, guarantees, and risk 
financing. See European Commission, European Economic 
Recovery Plan, COM(2008) 800 final (Brussels, 25 November 
2008). 
74 Mertens and Thiemann, “Building a Hidden Investment 
State?” (see note 72), 33. 
75 Isabel Camisão and Paulo Vila Maior, “Failure or Suc-
cess: Assessing the European Commission’s New Strategy to 
Foster EU’s Economic Recovery”, Journal of European Integra-
tion 42, no. 2 (2020): 195–211. 
interim evaluation and adjustment. A total invest-
ment volume of €500 billion has now been targeted. 
The duration of the EFSI was extended until the end 
of 2020 and new funding targets were added. 
In its evaluation report on the relevance, effective-
ness, and efficiency of the EFSI, the EIB came to an 
overall positive conclusion. The EFSI had succeeded 
in “mobilising a large volume of investment”76 and 
achieving the set of investment objectives. The Com-
mission was also very satisfied. According to the 
Commission, by October 2019 the EFSI had mobilised 
additional investments of €439.4 billion, increased 
the EU’s gross domestic product by 0.9 per cent, and 
created 1.1 million additional jobs. In addition, the 
EFSI’s impact would be felt in the long term, up until 
2037.77 The European Court of Auditors, however, 
drew a mixed conclusion in its report. The EFSI had 
proved to be an “effective instrument”, even if the 
estimates of the mobilised investments were partly 
exaggerated and excessive. However, it has replaced 
funding from other EU financial instruments and 
overlapped with the European Structural Funds.78 
But however one evaluates the work of the EFSI, 
the necessary close cooperation between the Euro-
pean Commission and the EIB has led to an expan-
sion of the range of economic policy instruments in 
the hands of the Commission. “In this process, the 
European Commission has gradually expanded dis-
cretion over investment vehicles, including the EIB.”79 
With the continuation of the EFSI in the new InvestEU 
Fund80 for the period 2021 to 2027, as proposed by 
the Commission, this trend towards a European in-
vestment management and steering policy, influenced 
primarily by the European Commission, could be con-
tinued and intensified. 
 
76 European Investment Bank, Evaluation of the European 
Fund for Strategic Investments (Luxembourg, June 2018), 3. 
77 See European Commission, “Juncker Plan Shows Tan-
gible Impact on Jobs and Growth in the EU”, Press Release 
(Brussels, 22 October 2019). 
78 European Court of Auditors, “European Fund for Stra-
tegic Investments: Action Needed to Make EFSI a Full Suc-
cess”, Official Journal of the European Union, (31 January 2019), 
Special Report no 03/2019. 
79 Mertens and Thiemann, “Building a Hidden Investment 
State?” (see note 72), 37. 
80 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Establish-
ing the “InvestEU” Programme, COM(2018) 439 final (Brussels, 
6 June 2018). 
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With the European Green Deal, the Commission, 
under its new president, Ursula von der Leyen, has 
proposed the next 10-year economic policy strategy. 
According to the European Commission, the Green 
Deal is a “new start”81 for European economic policy; 
the Union has “a unique opportunity” in the next 
decade “to lead the transition to a fair, climate-neutral 
and digital Europe”.82 With this strategy, the Commis-
sion wants to develop a European leitmotif that will 
in the future “put sustainability and the well-being of 
citizens at the centre of economic policy”.83 Economic 
growth is to be decoupled from the use of resources 
so that the “natural capital of the EU” can be protected 
and preserved, and this transition can be organised 
in a fair and inclusive manner. “Competitive sustain-
ability” is “at the heart of Europe’s social market 
economy”.84 
The transformation of the European economy in 
the long term is one goal of European economic 
policy-making; the other is to cushion the foreseeable 
deep recession as a result of the lockdowns to fight 
the Covid-19 pandemic.85 The EU institutions want to 
combine the short-term crisis response with massive 
economic stimulus and the long-term goal of a cli-
mate-neutral economy. Whether for the ambitious 
Green Deal or in response to the socio-economic con-
 
81 Idem, Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2020 
(see note 58), 1. 
82 Idem, Commission Work Programme for 2020, COM(2020) 
37 final (Brussels, 29 January 2020), 1. 
83 Idem, The European Green Deal (see note 32), 3. 
84 Idem, European Semester 2020: Country-specific Recommen-
dations (see note 60), 1. 
85 See A Roadmap for Recovery, paper of the President of the 
European Council and the President of the European Com-
mission (Brussels, 15 April 2020); European Commission, 
Europe’s Moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation, 
COM(2020) 456 final (Brussels, 27 May 2020), 3; European 
Parliament, Resolution New MFF, Own Resources and Recovery 
Plan, P9_TA-Prov(2020)0124 of 15 May 21020. 
sequences of the pandemic and the lockdowns, in 
both cases the EU is making use of its traditional 
instruments for European economic policy-making: 
regulation, competition and state aid law, economic 
policy coordination, and finally financial stimulus 
and incentives. 
Internal market regulation and the scope 
for state aid and competition law 
The internal market will remain at the heart of Euro-
pean economic policy. However, the Commission 
fears that “the further integration advances, the more 
politically challenging every ‘extra mile’ becomes 
as we touch on increasingly sensitive economic and 
social issues”. It therefore requires “more political 
courage and determination than 25 years ago, and 
greater effort than ever to close the gap between 
rhetoric and delivery”.86 The internal market needs 
to be developed, particularly in the areas of digital 
economy, capital, and financial markets and energy; 
services markets in particular offer the greatest poten-
tial for further integration.87 The development of new 
and sustainable digital technologies is a prerequisite 
to ensure the EU’s “technological sovereignty” and 
global leadership and to further stabilise the euro area 
with a banking and capital market union.88 The 
changes in worldwide economic structures and trade 
flows as a result of digitisation and globalisation 
will make adjustments of the European internal mar-
ket – and thus of EU economic policy – inevitable. 
 
86 European Commission, The Internal Market in a Changing 
World (see note 26), 1. 
87 Idem, Staff Working Document, Single Market Performance 
Report 2019, SWD (2019) 444 final (Brussels, 17 December 
2019). 
88 Idem, Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2020 
(see note 58). 
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The Commission has now presented an analysis89 
of the main obstacles, 13 of them, to advancing inte-
gration in the internal market. With a total of 18 
actions – ranging from new online platforms to the 
digitisation and modernisation of national adminis-
trations, as well as training and exchange of judges – 
the Commission90 aims to overcome these regulatory, 
administrative, and practical obstacles. The actions 
will be based on intensified cooperation and partner-
ship between the monitoring and enforcement 
authorities in the member states and with the Com-
mission, with the aim being to “enrich our lives in 
many ways” through “digital solutions such as com-
munications systems, artificial intelligence or quan-
tum technologies”.91 To this end, five years after an 
initial strategy92 for the digital internal market, the 
Commission has now presented a new data strategy93 
and a White Paper on artificial intelligence.94 
The Commission already tabled recommendations 
for the adaptation of existing European directives and 
regulations to the Green Deal, for example on the 
revision of the Emissions Trading System and its ex-
tension to additional sectors. By contrast, only a few 
truly new European legislative procedures were pre-
sented. What is new is the proposal for a European 
climate law,95 which will legally establish the com-
mon goal and the implementation path to climate 
neutrality by 2050. Also new are a CO2-limit compen-
sation system and legal provisions to ensure a safe, 
cycle-oriented, and sustainable value chain for bat-
teries. According to the European Commission, the 
Green Deal is intended to support the transition to 
climate-neutral production processes with adapted 
state aid regulations and guidelines, which, for 
 
89 Idem, Identifying and Tackling Barriers to the Single Market, 
COM(2020) 93 final (Brussels, 10 March 2020). 
90 Idem, The Long-term Action Plan to Improve the Implemen-
tation and Enforcement of Single Market Legislation, COM(2020) 94 
final (Brussels, 10 March 2020). 
91 Idem, Shaping Europe’s Digital Future (see note 18), 2. 
92 Idem, Strategy for a Digital Single Market for Europe, 
COM(2015) 192 final (Brussels, 6 May 2015). 
93 Idem, A European Data Strategy, COM(2020) 66 final (Brus-
sels, 19 February 2020). 
94 Idem, White Paper on Artificial Intelligence – A European 
Approach to Excellence and Trust, COM(2020) 65 final (Brussels, 
19 February 2020). 
95 Idem, Proposal for a Regulation Establishing the Framework 
for Achieving Climate Neutrality and Amending Regulation (EU) 
2018/1999 (European Climate Change Act), COM(2020)/0036 
(COD) (Brussels, 4 March 2020). 
example, offer financial support for companies that 
decarbonise or electrify their production processes. 
Member states should also be given greater financial 
leeway for the energy-efficient conversion of build-
ings and district heating networks, the transition to a 
circular economy, investments in energy production 
from renewable sources for own consumption, and 
aid to facilitate the phasing out of coal-fired power 
stations. 
The economic shock caused by the Covid-19 pan-
demic has magnified the challenge. The resulting 
drastic slump in growth, the increase in unemploy-
ment, and business insolvencies in the EU also threaten 
the integrity of the internal market. To cushion the 
asymmetric consequences of the Europe-wide lock-
downs for the economies united in the internal mar-
ket, the EU member states agreed in April on an 
initial corona aid package of €500 billion. In addition 
to the provision of credit support to the euro coun-
tries through the European Stability Mechanism and 
the new €100 billion instrument SURE (Support to 
mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency)96 to 
finance national short-time working schemes, the 
immediate measures focussed in particular on easing 
state aid control. The European Commission presented 
temporary state aid measures that it considered com-
patible with the single market and which it intended 
to approve very quickly following prior notification 
by member states. These included support measures 
such as direct grants, loans, guarantees, and tax ben-
efits.97 By reviewing foreign investment, the Commis-
sion sought to protect strategic European companies 
and institutions. The Union responded to the supply 
shortages that became apparent at the beginning of 
the pandemic and to the disruption of global supply 
chains – an obvious market failure – with joint ac-
tion on the procurement of medical products. Finally, 
to protect economic freedoms in the internal market, 
the Commission urged member states to keep their 
borders open for the exchange of goods and to allow 
the entry of workers, particularly in systemically 
important functions. Even in the crisis, the integrity 
 
96 Idem, Proposal for a Council Regulation Establishing a Euro-
pean Instrument for Temporary Assistance for Reducing the Risks 
of Unemployment Resulting from the COVID 19 Crisis (SURE), 
COM(2020) 139 final (Brussels, 2 April 2020). 
97 Idem, Temporary Framework for State Aid to Support the 
Economy in Response to the Current COVID-19 Outbreak, C(2020) 
1863 final, OJ C(2020) 1863 final (Brussels, 19 March 2020). 
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and stability of the internal market thus remained at 
the forefront of European economic policy responses. 
The new focus of the European Semester 
With the European Green Deal, the Commission 
announced many new plans and strategies: a Euro-
pean climate pact; a strategy for sustainable finance; 
another called “From Farm to Fork” to improve the 
environmental performance of agriculture and food 
processing; a new biodiversity strategy; a strategy for 
sustainable and intelligent mobility; and an action 
plan for recycling. With the help of the European 
climate law, a legally binding target for achieving 
climate neutrality is to be agreed. The Commission 
intends to monitor and evaluate the national imple-
mentation and enforcement plans every five years. 
Should a member state deviate from the agreed Euro-
pean approach in its assessment, it can publish cor-
responding reform recommendations as part of the 
CSR in the framework of the European Semester. 
In addition, thanks to the European Structural 
Funds, the priorities of public investment in the 
member states and the regions will be more closely 
coordinated across Europe and targeted towards the 
new climate policy objectives. Already for the Euro-
pean Semester 2019, the Commission had listed 
investment priorities for each member state in its 
annual country reports – and thus implicitly defined 
the priorities for support with Structural Funds – 
“in order to provide a clear roadmap for reforms”.98 
In the future, member states will be required to in-
corporate the recommendations into their investment 
strategies and take them into account when imple-
menting their structural support programmes. The 
investment guidelines thus identify the “priority 
investment areas and framework conditions for effec-
tive delivery of the 2021–2027 Cohesion Policy”.99 
They also require member states to report regularly 
on their progress in implementing CSRs and their 
investment programmes. 
 
98 Idem, A Modern Budget for a Union That Protects, Strengthens 
and Defends. Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027, 
COM(2018) 321 final (Brussels, 2 May 2018), 11. 
99 So the formulation in the 2019 Country Report for Ger-
many; see Idem, Commission Staff Working Document. Country 
Report for Germany 2019 with In-depth Review of the Prevention 
and Correction of Macroeconomic Imbalances, SWD(2019)1004 
final/2 (Brussels, 27 February 2019), Appendix D, 73. 
The climate and sustainability goals 
of the Green Deal are becoming the 
guiding principle of the 
European Semester. 
In the European Semester 2020, the Commission 
also integrated the 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of 
the United Nations (UN).100 In the future, each coun-
try report will be accompanied by a statement on the 
state of implementation of these global goals in the 
respective member state.101 The European Semester, 
which was originally intended to promote economic 
growth and employment, will thus be expanded to 
include sustainability policy as well as environmental 
and social objectives – differentiated according to 
the specific circumstances of the member states, but 
closely coordinated at the European level.102 
In this way, the technical and administrative co-
ordination approach of the European Semester can 
be used for almost all policy areas. The Semester thus 
becomes the central steering instrument of a compre-
hensive European economic process policy. However, 
this extension of scope as well as monitoring capabil-
ities is also being criticised: This, critics say, leads to 
an overburdening of the Semester, while the concen-
tration on the original economic and financial policy 
reform goals and approaches is lost. Some member 
states fear there will be negative effects on the en-
forceability and binding nature of the instrument. 
However, the Covid-19 pandemic has shown the 
need for closer economic policy coordination and 
the need to focus national strategies on common 
objectives and additional areas. The national crisis 
packages intended to contain the recession differ 
considerably regarding the financial volume being 
made available. However, the core aim of all pro-
grammes is to cushion the social and economic 
 
100 Idem, 2020 European Semester: Assessment of Progress on 
Structural Reforms, Prevention and Correction of Macroeconomic 
Imbalances and Results of the In-depth Review Provided for in Regu-
lation (EU) No 1176/2011, COM(2020) 150 final (Brussels, 
26 February 2020). 
101 Already the European Semester in 2018 was extended 
to include social policy topics; see Björn Hacker, “Die Euro-
päische Säule sozialer Rechte: Nutzung und Nutzen”, Inte-
gration 41, no. 2 (2018): 259–72; idem, Social European Semes-
ter? The European Pillar of Social Rights in Practical Test (Berlin: 
Institute for European Politics, 2018). 
102 European Commission, Annual Sustainable Growth 
Strategy 2020 (see note 58). 
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consequences of the crisis and to provide financial 
stimulus to revive the economies after the lockdowns. 
The measures now being taken at both the European 
and national levels to revive the economies are to be 
combined with the goal of climate neutrality. “Mov-
ing towards a more sustainable economic model, 
enabled by digital and clean technologies, can make 
Europe a transformational frontrunner,” says the 
European Commission.103 
The EU is thus following the economic policy 
model of “green economic growth”, which has been 
in development since the turn of the millennium by 
international economic institutions such as the Orga-
nisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).104 In the course of a “holistic development 
strategy”, the CSRs on structural reforms and invest-
ment in the member states are to be adapted to the 
guideline of sustainable growth. Climate neutrality 
in the context of the Green Deal and the UN’s sustain-
ability goals will thus become the guiding principles 
for economic recovery measures – at the regional, 
national, and EU levels – and for future European 
economic process policy. 
Financial incentives to implement the 
Green Deal 
In January 2020, the Commission presented a pro-
posal to finance the calculated annual investment 
of €260 billion up to 2030 as a first specification of 
its Green Deal communication package. The money 
is to come from three sources: the EU and national 
budgets, the EIB, and the private sector. 
In addition to its planning for the long-term 
European Green Deal and the immediate Covid-19 
response, the Commission used the medium-term 
stimulus measures to further focus on its policy 
priorities. On 23 April 2020, the European Council, 
on the recommendation of ECOFIN, combined the 
approval of the first rescue package with a mandate 
to the European Commission to prepare a proposal 
for an additional recovery fund to provide strong 
economic stimulus. On 27 May 2020, the Commission 
presented this new proposal together with the Euro-
 
103 Idem, European Semester 2020: Country-specific Recommen-
dations (see note 60), 1. 
104 See OECD, Towards Green Growth (Paris, 2011), and 
World Bank, Inclusive Green Growth: The Pathway to Sustainable 
Development (Washington, DC, 2012). 
pean recovery fund “Next Generation EU” (NGEU) 
and linked it to its Green Deal and digitisation, that 
is, to its new growth strategy. The European Council 
endorsed this proposal in principle at its historically 
long, extraordinary summit on 17–21 July 2020. 
The aim now is to create a temporary cyclical budget 
alongside the usual seven-year financial framework. 
A total of €750 billion will be added to the European 
budget to provide targeted assistance to the regions 
and sectors most affected by the consequences of the 
pandemic.105 
The Multiannual Financial Framework 
2021–2027 
The Commission’s original draft budget for the period 
2021 to 2027, adopted in May 2020, already provided 
for 25 per cent of agricultural and Structural Funds 
to be invested in measures to achieve the common 
climate objectives.106 The European Council has now 
decided to further increase this amount to 30 per cent 
of the total European budget and also to focus the 
additional money from the temporary European Eco-
nomic Recovery Plan, the NGEU, on climate action. 
The temporary increase of €47.5 billion, the front-
loading of European Structural Funds with the new 
programme ReactEU,107 and the newly created Just 
Transition Fund (JTF) for economic transformation 
support will mainly serve the EU’s two top economic 
policy objectives for the next decade – climate neu-
trality and digitisation. The new Recovery and Resili-
ence Facility,108 totalling €672.5 billion (of which 
€312.5 billion will be in the form of non-repayable 
grants), will also support the Green Deal and digitisa-
tion priorities. As part of Europe’s response to the 
consequences of the pandemic, the Commission has 
therefore found a way to underpin the huge invest-
 
105 European Council, Extraordinary European Council (17, 18, 
19, 20 and 21 July 2020) – Conclusions, EUCO 10/20 (Brussels, 
21 July 2020). 
106 See European Commission, Europe’s Moment: Repair and 
Prepare for the Next Generation (see note 85). 
107 Idem, Proposal for a regulation amending Regulation (EU) 
No 1303/2013 as regards exceptional additional resources and im-
plementing arrangements under the Investment for growth and jobs 
goal to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of 
the COVID-19 pandemic and preparing a green, digital and resilient 
recovery of the economy (REACT-EU), COM(2020) 451 final (Brus-
sels, 28 May 2020). 
108 Idem, Proposal for a Regulation Establishing a Recovery and 
Resilience Facility, COM(2020) 408 final (Brussels, 28 May 2020). 
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ment needs for the EU’s new green growth strategy 
with appropriately funded European support pro-
grammes. 
The EIB as a motor for investment 
The Commission has also presented and updated a 
new investment programme – the InvestEU Fund.109 
Similar to the EFSI, it aims to secure private invest-
ment with the help of a guarantee from the EU budget. 
As part of the next Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF) and the NGEU, the Commission proposed a 
large EU budget guarantee of €31.6 billion for the 
InvestEU Fund. This should mobilise an investment 
volume of up to €400 billion. Sixty per cent of this 
money should be used from the “sustainable infra-
structure window” funding area for climate policy 
objectives alone. The European Council drastically 
reduced the proposed amount and agreed guarantees 
of 2.8 billion in the MFF and 5.6 billion in the addi-
tional NGEU. Nevertheless, the revised EU investment 
programme will also serve the new growth strategy. 
With InvestEU, the EFSI becomes the 
Commission’s permanent economic 
policy instrument. 
The Juncker Commission’s initially temporary EFSI 
programme to revive the European economies after 
the euro crisis is thus being consolidated under a new 
name as an additional economic policy instrument of 
the Commission. As the national development banks 
are also to be directly involved in the new programme 
in the future, the InvestEU Fund will gain even more 
impact; at the same time, national investment deci-
sions and support will be directed to European objec-
tives. 
The guarantee for private climate protection invest-
ments is also to be supplemented by the EIB’s trans-
formation into the “Climate Bank of the EU” and by 
support programmes of the national development 
banks. The EIB is to gradually increase the share of its 
financing focussed on climate protection and environ-
mental sustainability to 50 per cent of its financing 
volume by the end of the decade. The Commission 
hopes that this will result in a total investment of 
around €600 billion for climate protection. 
 
109 Idem, Proposal for a Regulation Establishing the “InvestEU” 
Programme, COM(2020) 403 final (Brussels, 29 May 2020). 
The Just Transition Fund 
In addition to these incentives and investments, the 
Commission proposes a Just Transition Mechanism to 
encourage the phasing out of fossil fuels (coal, peat, 
and shale gas) and to dampen the costs for the regions 
and sectors concerned.110 This mechanism will also 
consist of three elements: the new JTF mentioned 
above, a special transitional arrangement under the 
InvestEU Fund, and a new EIB public-sector lending 
facility. 
What is really new is the proposal for an additional 
fund, the JTF. For this fund, the Commission had 
already presented a proposal for a regulation in Janu-
ary 2020,111 including the expected distribution of the 
funds among the member states.112 A revised version 
followed in May 2020,113 in which the originally esti-
mated €7.5 billion was increased to around €10 bil-
lion and supplemented by an additional €30 billion 
from the temporary economic stimulus budget NGEU. 
The agreement of the European Council on 21 July 
2020 now provides for significant cuts in this pro-
posal. The heads of state and government agreed to 
set for the JTF in the next MFF a volume of €7.5 bil-
lion, and in the NGEU an additional €10 billion, 
bringing the total JTF budget to €17.5 billion. Member 
states will also have to complement the JTF alloca-
tions with reallocations from other European Struc-
tural Funds – the European Regional Development 
Fund and the European Social Fund – and national 
co-financing. Support will be provided for investment 
in SMEs; business start-ups and incubators; research 
and innovation; recycling; the use of new and clean 
technologies; digitisation; site restoration and decon-
 
110 Idem, Investment Plan for a Sustainable Europe. Investment 
Plan for the European Green Deal, COM(2020) 21 final (Brussels, 
14 January 2020). 
111 Idem, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council Establishing the Fund for a Just Transition, 
COM(2020) 22 final (Brussels, 14 January 2020). 
112 Idem, Amended Proposal for a Regulation Laying Down Com-
mon Provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund and the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund and Financial Rules for Those and for 
the Asylum and Migration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the 
Border Management and Visa Instrument, COM(2020) 23 final 
(Brussels, 14 January 2020). 
113 Idem, Amended Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Just Transition Fund, 
COM(2020) 460 final (Brussels, 28 May 2020). 
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tamination; further training, retraining, and job 
search; and the active inclusion of job seekers. 
The future role of the Commission 
With its new growth strategy, the revised proposal 
for the next MFF, and the temporary cyclical budget 
NGEU, the Commission seems to be trying to 
strengthen its role in economic policy coordination 
and the European Semester. It is increasingly deter-
mining the priorities and focal points of European 
economic policy-making and the sequence of cor-
responding reforms in the member states; it monitors 
their implementation and compliance with European 
obligations; and it decides on flexibility or decisive-
ness in the assessments, and thus on the sanctioning 
or approval of member state policies. 
European climate law creates the legal basis for 
more narrowly defined steering and European moni-
toring of national economic policy-making with 
regard to green and sustainable growth, in line with 
the objectives of the European Green Deal. The Euro-
pean Semester is developing into the key steering 
instrument of this green economic process policy: Its 
scope of application is being expanded, the instru-
ment is being more closely interlinked with the EU 
budget, and it is thus becoming more effective. In 
the future, the allocation of European funding will 
be linked even more directly to the objectives, con-
tent, and recommendations of economic policy co-
ordination; this will increase the efficiency of Euro-
pean Community economic policy-making. The objec-
tives and guidelines for the European Semester and 
the country-specific reform recommendations, which 
will be supported by European funding, will in turn 
be based on the growth strategy of the Green Deal. 
The Commission is becoming the 
dominant and guiding actor in 
European economic policy-making. 
The permanent successor to the EFSI, the InvestEU 
Fund, will be managed by the Commission itself, with 
the EIB serving as its “preferred implementing part-
ner”. At the same time, the Commission wants to 
work with national development banks and inter-
national financial institutions. With the introduction 
of investment guidelines in the European Semester 
and the targeting of corresponding support measures 
with the help of the Structural Funds, the Commis-
sion now has the possibility to co-determine national 
and regional investment priorities along the common 
European guidelines. The new JTF, which is to cushion 
the transition to climate-neutral growth, also serves 
the overarching economic policy objectives of the EU. 
The linking of the European funding programmes 
with the European Semester, the strengthening of the 
Commission’s supervisory role in the implementation 
of national and regional programmes, and the align-
ment of all steering instruments of European eco-
nomic process policy with the objectives of the Euro-
pean Green Deal and the digitisation of the internal 
market will considerably expand the Commission’s 
economic policy scope for action. In its role as guard-
ian of the European Community interest, it works 
implicitly to bring together the different economic 
policy interests, objectives, and possibilities of the 
member states into a common policy. Since the intro-
duction of the European Semester in 2011, the Com-
mission has gradually developed from a service pro-
vider that administers the coordination – but exerts 
hardly any influence in terms of content – into an 
initiator and leader of European economic policy-
making. 
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The EU has only a limited range of instruments for 
an effective and efficient European economic process 
policy. Its powers are limited to the coordination of 
the economic policies of the member states, though 
the progress of economic integration in the internal 
market and monetary union makes a common Euro-
pean economic policy increasingly urgent. Although 
the foundations and the framework of the European 
economic constitution are laid down with the inclu-
sion of the concept of the “social market economy” in 
the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU is still denied important 
instruments for its implementation. It has no legis-
lative powers in the field of tax policy with which it 
could, on the one hand, set tax policy incentives and, 
on the other, guarantee a comprehensive, level play-
ing field for companies in the internal market. The 
same problem of limited or inadequate powers exists 
in the areas of fiscal and budgetary policy, social and 
employment policy, and education policy. Even in the 
core area of European economic policy-making – the 
regulation of the internal market – the EU cannot 
intervene in all four market freedoms to the same 
extent. The implementation record of the CSRs within 
the framework of the European Semester shows again 
and again that the regulation of the exchange of 
goods in the internal market largely works; but in the 
areas of the freedom of services and the free move-
ment of persons, national reservations about Euro-
pean regulation are frequently articulated. 
Economic process policy is the daily transfer and 
implementation of the economic constitution to cur-
rent economic policy-making issues and challenges. 
It is thus a domain of governmental policy-making. It 
is therefore the responsibility of the Commission to 
initiate and steer European economic process policy. 
But its resources are limited: It must primarily use the 
soft instruments of coordination and combine its eco-
nomic policy initiatives with tools from other policy 
areas. It may use European budget resources for eco-
nomic policy incentives or to sanction hesitant mem-
ber states. It can also use its freedom of action and 
autonomy in foreign trade policy as well as European 
competition and state aid control to achieve Commu-
nity objectives and tasks. But the final binding deci-
sion is taken by the member states’ executives in the 
Council. They must then implement at the national 
level what has been decided in the EU. If criticism 
of these European measures is voiced in the member 
states’ domestic politics and resistance forms in indi-
vidual interest groups or national parliaments, the 
enthusiasm of national governments to implement 
them often wanes. 
It is true that the Commission has been able to 
increase its scope for action in recent years. However, 
the following constants continue to make it difficult 
to achieve a coherent and efficient European eco-
nomic policy-making: 
a) There is a lack of convergence of member states’ 
economies and economic policies. National eco-
nomic and growth models are still disparate, rang-
ing from the supply- and export-oriented German 
model, which is based on national competitive-
ness, to the still strongly economic statism and 
demand-oriented French approach. The “varieties 
of capitalism”114 make a coherent European eco-
nomic policy and further harmonisation of national 
service markets, social systems, and thus suprana-
tional legislative activity more difficult. In addi-
tion, with the accession of new members – espe-
cially the less competitive and structurally weak 
economies of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe – 
the divergences increased, and with them the 
 
114 Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage, ed. Peter A. Hall and David Soskice 
(Oxford and New York, NY, 2001); Peter A. Hall, “Varieties 
of Capitalism and the Euro Crisis”, West European Politics 37, 
no. 6 (2014): 1223–43; idem, “The Economics and Politics 
of the Euro Crisis”, German Politics 21, no. 4 (2012): 355–71. 
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demands for financial and protectionist compen-
sation mechanisms. 
b) Soft economic policy co-ordination alone – based 
on common objectives and legally non-binding 
recommendations – is hardly a means of commit-
ting member states with their heterogeneous inter-
ests to a coherent policy. European economic policy 
strategies and proposals must inevitably remain 
fundamental, general, and non-specific, without 
any additional incentives or sanctions, in order to 
achieve a broad European fit. The concrete CSRs 
derived from the strategies are often not appropri-
ate or suited to the particular national problems 
and challenges, given the different economic policy 
models of economic and growth in the member 
states. There is a mismatch between the need to 
agree on common European policy solutions and 
the specific needs, requirements, and expectations 
of specific member states and their regions. At 
the same time, the limited incentives or sanction 
instruments of European economic process policy, 
that is, European funding and strict conditioning 
of support, trigger traditional defensive reflexes 
in the member states, depending on the degree to 
which they are affected. Those who provide the 
financial incentives through their contributions to 
the EU budget are pushing for conditionality and 
the limitation of support, whereas the beneficiary 
member states want to receive as much support 
as possible without conditions that are too strict. 
c) The existing procedures and instruments of the 
developing European economic policy are becom-
ing increasingly politicised. As a result, the Com-
mission cannot act as a purely technical imple-
menting authority but must take into account the 
different policy conditions in the EU and member 
states. It is not the question of whether an indica-
tor of the imbalance procedure, the criteria for the 
indebtedness of a national budget, or the imple-
mentation of a country-specific recommendation 
to reform labour markets or social policy legisla-
tion has been respected, observed, or implemented 
that ultimately determines the Commission’s action. 
Rather, it must weigh up the consequences of its 
decisions for the EU, the single market, and the 
single currency as a whole – in other words, for 
the stability and cohesion of the EU. 
In the areas of the evolving European economic 
process policy, a Commission that sees itself or is per-
ceived as a political actor would have to be subject to 
democratic control; its decisions and actions would 
have to be subject to open and transparent democratic 
discourse that is convincing. The even greater involve-
ment of the European Parliament and the national par-
liaments in the European Semester therefore seems 
unavoidable. After all, it goes far beyond a purely ad-
ministrative process that can be managed by a neutral 
actor. Although the parliaments are already informed 
and involved by the Commission and national gov-
ernments, their influence on the content and objec-
tives of European economic policy-making is limited. 
The current Europe-wide and unprecedented crisis 
resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic has created 
opportunities for change. The member states have had 
to recognise that – for all their differences in their 
economic policy models and starting points – they 
are nevertheless inextricably linked, indeed chained 
together, through the single market and the single 
currency. Even before the pandemic, the EU had 
already formulated two economic policy objectives – 
climate neutrality and digitisation – the importance 
of which was underlined by the crisis. The EU thus 
has economic policy objectives to which it can orient 
its economic process policy. After an initial hesitation, 
the European Commission has used the shock of 
the member states to set its political priorities; at the 
same time, it has tried to put the European Commu-
nity’s interests first, as can be seen from the conclu-
sions and discussions of the European Council. 
The pandemic crisis, through no fault of its own, 
and the extent and depth of its socio-economic con-
sequences are so drastic and far-reaching that this 
break can be used to refocus economic policy-making 
on long-term goals. The conflicts between persistent 
forces and advocates of change associated with every 
change in policy are being replaced by the crisis and, 
in part, levelled out. Unlike the euro and debt crises 
a decade ago, the corona shock has opened a window 
for reform. 
The executives at both the European and national 
levels seem to have realised – and hopefully accepted 
in the long term – that only more coordination and 
Community action can contain the negative conse-
quences of this crisis. Where exactly the line is between 
European common ground and national interests will 
have to be negotiated from issue to issue; depending 
on the individual question, it may be more national 
or more European. For example, the relationship 
between European industrial policy and strict compe-
tition supervision by the Commission will certainly 
lead to controversial negotiations; the same applies 
to negotiations on the approximation of national tax 
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policies, or those on the volume, form, and distribu-
tion of financial stimulus from the European budget. 
But the strategic reorientation of European economic 
policy-making towards green and sustainable growth 
will no longer be fundamentally questioned. 
Unitarisation trends in European 
economic policy 
This close coordination between European and mem-
ber state institutions and the increasingly concrete 
measures being taken will lead to a further unitarisa-
tion of European economic policy. In 1962, Konrad 
Hesse115 noted tendencies of unitarisation for the still 
young Federal Republic of Germany: the concentra-
tion of tasks at the federal level, a unitarisation of 
jurisdiction, a significant strengthening of the federal 
government, and finally a progressive coordination 
of executive policies at the federal and state levels. 
These trends have also been evident for some time 
in the multi-level European system116 – and they will 
continue to gain momentum. Even in those policy 
areas where legislative activity is formally the respon-
sibility of member states and the EU has only comple-
mentary and coordinating powers, European guide-
lines and recommendations increasingly dominate 
regulatory and legislative activities. At the very least, 
they provide the templates that the member states’ 
legislative bodies follow or have to follow. The deci-
sive role of the ECJ in the creation of the European 
internal market is undisputed, as is the unitarising 
tendency of the European Commission’s role in steer-
ing economic policy processes to become increasingly 
important. With the help of the European Semester, 
the Commission defines the policies of the member 
states. The common interest of the member states 
to protect against global challenges, to utilise the eco-
nomic advantages of integration, and to secure a 
level playing field in the internal market outweighs 
national concerns about the loss of economic policy 
autonomy and manifests itself in slow and cautious 
steps towards closer and more binding economic 
 
115 See Konrad Hesse, Der unitarische Bundesstaat (Karlsruhe, 
1962). 
116 See Ingeborg Tömmel, “System-Entwicklung und 
Politikgestaltung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft am 
Beispiel der Regionalpolitik”, in Die Integration Europas, 
ed. Michael Kreile, PVS Sonderheft 23/1992 (Opladen, 1992), 
185–208. 
policy coordination. The executive nature of Euro-
pean policy is therefore a lengthy process. 
Just as the unitarisation of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, as stated by Konrad Hesse, was not a pure 
centralisation process, the unitarisation tendencies 
in the EU do not seem to lead to centralisation and 
supranationalisation. Rather, mechanisms for inte-
grating and merging European and national politics 
are becoming apparent. The unitarisation of the EU 
does not mean the end of member state economic 
policy or even the death of the member states, their 
political undermining, or subordination to a supra-
national European federal state. Instead, new forms 
of progressive interdependence and understanding 
are developing. The objectives defined in the course of 
the EU’s long-standing economic policy strategies are 
becoming starting points and guidelines for function-
al economic policy unitarisation at the European and 
national levels. 
Abbreviations 
CAP Common Agricultural Policy 
COMPET Competitiveness Council 
CSR Country-specific Recommendations 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
ECOFIN Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
EFSI European Fund for Strategic Investments 
EIB European Investment Bank 
EPSCO Employment, Social Policy, Health and 
Consumer Affairs Council 
EU European Union 
EU-27 EU with 27 member states  
EU-28 EU with 28 member states  
EUI European University Institute (Florence) 
GNI Gross National Income 
IPCEI Important Projects of Common European 
Interest 
JTF Just Transition Fund 
MFF Multiannual Financial Framework 
NGEU Next Generation EU (Fund) 
NRP National Reform Programme 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
SMEs Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
SURE Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an 
Emergency 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 
UN United Nations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
